Verification Coverage by Castaño, Rodrigo et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
70
6.
03
79
6v
1 
 [c
s.S
E]
  1
2 J
un
 20
17
Verification Coverage
R. Castan˜o1, V. Braberman1, D. Garbervetsky1, S. Uchitel1,2
1 Departamento de Computacio´n, FCEN, Universidad de Buenos Aires, Argentina
2 Department of Computing, Imperial College London, UK
{rcastano,vbraber,diegog,suchitel}@dc.uba.ar
Abstract. Software Model Checkers have shown outstanding perfor-
mance improvements in recent times. Moreover, for specific use cases,
formal verification techniques have shown to be highly effective, leading
to a number of high-profile success stories. However, widespread adop-
tion remains unlikely in the short term and one of the remaining ob-
stacles in that direction is the vast number of instances which software
model checkers cannot fully analyze within reasonable memory and CPU
bounds. The majority of verification tools fail to provide a measure of
progress or any intermediate verification result when such situations oc-
cur.
Inspired in the success that coverage metrics have achieved in industry,
we propose to adapt the definition of coverage to the context of verifica-
tion. We discuss some of the challenges in pinning down a definition that
resembles the deeply rooted semantics of test coverage. Subsequently we
propose a definition for a broad family of verification techniques: those
based on Abstract Reachability Trees. Moreover, we discuss a general
approach to computing an under-approximation of such metric and a
specific heuristic to improve the performance.
Finally, we conduct an empirical evaluation to assess the viability of our
approach.
1 Introduction
Test coverage in its different flavors is widely adopted and discussed [19,17,12] by
major companies with regards to development and testing methodologies. Other
software verification tools and techniques [16,2] have also been successfully used
in industry for either full verification or bug finding.
However, verification tools sometimes produce inconclusive results, that is,
they neither find errors nor completely prove the absence of a specific bug within
the allotted time or resource bounds. In these cases, most tools fail to provide
any safety assurances, making the time spent on verification entirely useless.
In this work, we adapt the definition of code coverage used in testing to a
broad family of verification algorithms. Our definition attempts to replicate the
semantics of code coverage in testing, so as to extend the deep-rooted under-
standing of the concept to the context of verification.
The main contribution of this work is a novel perspective on quantifying
progress and safety assurances of incomplete verification attempts. We discuss
a number of approaches to producing an under-approximation of the coverage
metric we put forth and also propose a heuristic to improve the efficiency. We
empirically evaluate a proof-of-concept implementation on benchmark instances
and discuss the results. Finally, we end the discussion with an overview of related
works and a few concluding remarks.
2 Motivation
2.1 Why quantify incomplete verification coverage?
Verification encompasses a wide range of techniques and the reasons for pro-
ducing an inconclusive result are equally as varied. Some approaches, such as
Corral [15] and many other flavors of BMC [8], selectively explore a portion of the
possible behaviors of a system. In many cases, BMC-based tools can normally
terminate the execution without a conclusive result.
Many others attempt to exhaustively explore a possibly infinite state space.
This can lead to long running explorations which, in turn, could case exhaustion
of system resources, including memory and CPU time budget.
Moreover, many tools can fail throughout verification even after performing
significant work. For example, some techniques rely on finding an interpolant to
a formula in order to refine an abstraction. But there are fundamental and prac-
tical limitations to the underlying logic engines that produce the interpolants,
therefore, this process can fail. In this setting, as long as the solver is capable
of generating interpolants, abstraction refinement continues, possibly for many
iterations, and then suddenly stops without a conclusive result.
In all these cases, despite the inconclusive results, the verification attempt
analyzed a number of system behaviors. Similar to a test suite, an incomplete
verification attempt can help increase the confidence in the correctness of the
system and an adequate measure could be used as part of a dependability case.
2.2 Challenges in defining verification coverage
Test suite adequacy is frequently described with respect to code coverage. How-
ever, the usual metrics used in testing are not immediately applicable to verifi-
cation.
Code coverage in testing is defined in terms of the parts of the system ex-
ercised throughout the execution of at least one test case. More specifically,
statement coverage is defined as [20]:
CStatement of T for P is the fraction of statements of program P executed
by at least one test case in T .
CStatement =
number of executed statements
number of statements
One of the difficulties of adapting this definition is that, in the context of
testing, test cases are expected to run to completion but that notion cannot
always be directly translated to partial verification attempts. More precisely,
verification techniques frequently employ abstractions that do not necessarily
capture any execution in its entirety. This can be misleading, because no relevant
assertions might have been reached by the time the verification attempt was
interrupted and assertion failures related to the explored statements, even if
trivial, would not have been caught.
Example 1 (Loop unrolling).
1 int nondet();
2 #define false 0;
3 int main() {
4 for (i = 0; i < 1000000; i++);
5 assert(false);
6 return 0;
7 }
Fig. 1. Long running loop.
Let’s consider the example in Figure 1 and an exploration using value analy-
sis, a verification technique that explores paths in the Control Flow Automaton
(CFA) of the program while keeping track of the actual values of variables, i.e.
value analysis.
The for -loop runs 1000000 times increasing the value of i to that number. In
this case, with a short enough time limit, the algorithm would keep unwinding
the loop until timing out. This situation leads to an explored state space that
contains no complete executions of the code. The analysis would be oblivious to
the assertion in any incomplete verification attempt that does not fully unwind
the loop.
Conversely, if we considered the exercised statements as covered, a relatively
high coverage would be misleading, when the trivially false assertion would be
reached by the only possible execution of the code. △
When defining a notion of verification coverage, one might be tempted to
quantify progress by directly measuring the internal representation of the tech-
nique as it is. In fact, this is the implementation of the coverage measure reported
by CPAchecker[6]. However, the abstractions commonly used can capture spuri-
ous behaviors due to over-approximation. Consequently, it could be misleading
to quantify progress this way.
Example 2 (Unreachable code).
1 int nondet();
2 int main() {
3 int x = nondet();
4 int reached_dead_code = 0;
5 int z = 1;
6 if (x*x < 0) {
7 reached_dead_code = 1;
8 } else {
9 z = 1;
10 }
11 assert(!reached_dead_code);
12 return 0;
13 }
Fig. 2. Dead code.
The code snippet in Figure 2 contains unreachable code. The condition in
the if statement never holds, that is, the then branch can never be executed,
therefore the assertion in line 11 always holds.
In this case, a verification attempt using lazy predicate analysis would ini-
tially deal with an abstract representation which would not be precise enough
to prove the then branch unreachable. This first attempt would find a spurious
counterexample and attempt to refine the abstraction. However, abstraction re-
finement, i.e. finding the right predicate to prove the then branch unreachable,
would fail due to the non-linear condition.
In this case, the unreachable portion of the state space corresponds to dead
code, but more subtle cases can, and often do, arise in practice. Therefore, unless
unreachable states are ignored, the coverage metric can be arbitrarily inflated
with respect to its intuitive interpretation. △
3 Coverage definition for Abstract Reachability Trees
In this section, we will present a definition of coverage for Abstract Reachability
Tree [13] (ART)-based techniques. In order to make the presentation self-con-
tained, we will first provide the necessary background.
3.1 Background
ARTs are a widely used data structure in verification. A number of dissim-
ilar techniques have been implemented using ARTs, including lazy predicate
abstraction [13], BMC [8], value analysis [7], IC3-based techniques [11] and CE-
GAR variants of the former, among other. As such, targeting ARTs allows us to
handle a wide variety of techniques, at least in their ART implementation.
Moreover, Conditional Model Checking [5,4] (CMC) has been instantiated
for ART-based techniques and implemented within CPAchecker [6], providing
valuable infrastructure. CMC proposes to augment software model checkers by
either returning a counterexample to the property of interest or returning a
condition ψ under which the model checking attempt proved the program safe
to execute.
The instantiation of CMC for ART-based techniques represents ψ in terms
of Assumption Automata over the alphabet of statements. That is, ψ in the case
of ARTs is a predicate over sequences of statements.
An Assumption Automaton captures the structure of the ART at the mo-
ment when verification was interrupted: with the exception of a distinguished
state, each state in the Assumption Automaton corresponds to a single state
in the Control Flow Automaton of the system-under-verification and transitions
are labeled with statements. Lastly, the distinguished state FALSE captures the
unexplored state space.
Consequently, ψ(pi) holds iff pi does not constitute a path from the initial
state to the distinguished state FALSE in the Assumption Automaton.
3.2 Definition
Our definition aims to tackle the issues discussed and exemplified in Section 2 by
adapting the notion of running a test to completion to the context of verification.
Definition 1. Given a predicate ψ that corresponds to the output of a condi-
tional model checker and a set T of terminating executions of the system-under
-verification, i.e. feasible paths from an initial state in the CFA and reaching the
system exit, a statement s is considered to be covered by the exploration when
the following holds:
∃ t ∈ T , such that ϕ(t) ∧ isExercisedWithinAnalysisψ(s, t)
Moreover, in the context of ART-based analyses, the predicate isExercised-
WithinAnalysisψ(s, t) holds iff:
∃ pi ∈ Σ∗, such that isPrefix(pi, t) ∧ s ∈ pi ∧ ψ(pi)
where isPrefix(pi, t) = ∃pi′ ∈ Σ∗ such that pi · pi′ = t and · stands for con-
catenation.
Intuitively, Definition 1 states that a statement s is considered covered when
some terminating execution (t) satisfying the safety property (ϕ(t)) contains an
analyzed (ψ(p)) prefix (isPrefix(p, t)) that exercises s (s ∈ p).
Having adapted the notion of a particular statement being covered in the
context of verification, statement coverage in verification can then be defined as:
CStatement(ψ) for P is the fraction of statements of program P covered by
the exploration captured by ψ.
CStatement(ψ) =
number of statements covered by ψ
number of statements
input : An Assumption Automaton: AA, A system S
output: A number indicating statement coverage.
1 allStatements := statements(S)
2 covered := ∅
3 remaining := allStatements
4 while remaining 6= ∅ do
5 specification := terminatingExecutionSpecCovering(remaining, AA)
6 result := verify(S, specification)
7 if result.unknown then
8 warning(“Producing under-approximation.”)
9 break
10 else if ¬ result.foundCounterexamples then
11 break
12 else
13 cex := result.counterexamples
14 covered := covered ∪ exercisedWithinAnalysis(cex, AA)
15 remaining := remaining \ covered
16 return covered/allStatements
Algorithm 1: Computing Coverage
4 Computing coverage
We propose to compute verification coverage by encoding, as a safety property,
the negation of the conditions under which a statement is covered. By feeding
the safety property to an off-the-shelf verification tool, the counterexamples pro-
duced confirm that the statement is covered whereas, if the output indicates the
property holds, then the statement is not covered. Concretely, our algorithm
takes as input an Assumption Automaton and outputs the verification coverage.
As shown in Figure 1, we iteratively augment the set covered until either the
verification task yields no counterexample (line 11) or all statements have been
covered (loop head, line 4). When the former occurs, statements in remaining,
the complement of covered are not covered by the exploration captured in the
Assumption Automaton.
Our algorithm yields the exact statement coverage as long as the procedure
verify always return a conclusive result. In practice, this is not always the case,
as anticipated in line 8, therefore many times the algorithm produces an under-
approximation. It is worth noting that if an exact result is not desired, it is
possible to add a time budget or a limit in the number of iterations of the main
loop and the result is guaranteed to be an under-approximation. We will discuss
a generic approach to producing under-approximations in Section 5
The specifics of how to build the corresponding specification depend on the
desired verification technique and chosen tool.
Lastly, exercisedWithinAnalysis instantiates the predicate isExercisedWithin-
Analysis, as stated in Definition 1.
The function exercisedWithinAnalysis is implemented by interpreting the
counterexample as a path in the Assumption Automaton. The automaton con-
tains a distinguished state FALSE, which captures the unexplored state space,
and given the counterexample, i.e. a sequence of statements capturing a system
execution, it is possible to follow, from an initial state, the transitions corre-
sponding to each statement of the execution. The statements corresponding to
transitions before reaching FALSE will be included in the result of the procedure.
Definition 2. Given a sequence of statement cex, the following holds for the
result of exercisedWithinAnalysis:
s ∈ exercisedWithinAnalysis(cex, AA) iff
isExercisedWithinAnalysisψ(s, cex)
5 Under-approximating coverage
Algorithm 1 generates the exact coverage under ideal conditions, but might incur
in a significant performance penalty in doing so. Consequently, in many cases it
is impractical to compute the exact coverage and an under-approximation can
provide value.
Our approach to computing a verification coverage under-approximation con-
sists of generating a number of executions and then, for each of them, computing
which of the statements exercised remain within the explored state space.
The input to our algorithm is an Assumption Automaton representing the
progress achieved by an interrupted verification attempt and our output consists
of an under-approximation of the verification coverage.
Calculating the number of statements within the explored region is fairly
straightforward, as explained in Section 4: this is implemented in procedure
exercisedWithinAnalysis for Algorithm 1.
On the other hand, even though a number of suitable existing techniques can
generate system executions, it might be necessary to tweak them for the specific
use case of under-approximating a metric of coverage.
In principle, it would be possible to leverage random testing or logging of
the running system to fulfill the goal of gathering system executions, but we will
only focus on a verification-based approach.
As explained in the previous section, we can use standard verification tech-
niques to generate system executions. To do so, we can create a specification
asserting that no executions reach the program exit. A feasible counterexample
would then constitute a terminating execution, as intended.
One caveat with all these standard approaches is that they fundamentally
ignore the end goal, which is to compute a good under-approximation of the
verification coverage metric.
Custom trace prioritization in ART-based verification
The idea of using standard verification to produce system executions is appealing
to us due to its simplicity and ease of implementation.
However, there seems to be room for improvement: the information captured
by the Assumption Automaton of the incomplete verification attempt is not
leveraged to maximize the coverage under-approximation.
We implemented a heuristic that aims to prioritize the generation of traces
that maximize the coverage measure. Our heuristic is compatible with any ART-
based analysis.
The heuristic consists in assigning a tentative coverage score to each state
in the Assumption Automaton and using the score to guide the exploration
of ART nodes. In order to compute that score we compose the Assumption
Automaton with the CFA and calculate the least fixed point of the function
Reach((sa, sCFA)), where sa and sCFA states of the Assumption Automaton
and the CFA, respectively and (sa, sCFA) are the states of the composition:
Reach((sa, sCFA)) =


sCFA ∪
⋃
(s′
a
,s′
CFA
)∈succ((sa,sCFA))
Reach((s′a, s
′
CFA)) if sa 6= FALSE
∅ otherwise
The size of the largest Reach((sa, sCFA)) will constitute the tentative score
assigned to state sa.
Intuitively, the least fixed point will tend to propagate backwards the lines
to be potentially covered. Accordingly, if ART construction is prioritized taking
into account this score, states that potentially cover more lines will tend to be
expanded first.
Concretely, we will use the tentative coverage score to tweak standard traver-
sals such that the exploration is slightly guided toward more promising regions
of the state space.
6 Evaluation
We conducted a round of initial experiments with the exact algorithm, but the
time necessary to compute the coverage measure was, in many cases, a multiple
of the original verification time. This prompted us to develop the under-approxi-
mation algorithm discussed. In this section we discuss the preliminary empirical
evaluation we performed.
Our main research questions are the following:
– RQ 1: Is it possible to compute a useful under-approximation of verification
coverage efficiently?
– RQ 2: Does the heuristic proposed improve the under-approximation pro-
duced within a limited time budget?
Our experiments were composed of two phases. The first phase consisted of
running a verification algorithm with a time limit of 900 s, which is standard in
verification competitions [3]. For this phase, we used 2 different techniques, lazy
predicate abstraction and value analysis. We try unrelated technique in the first
phase to evaluate how our approach performs in different settings.
The instances we used are those previously chosen to evaluate CMC, be-
longing to the families SystemC and DeviceDrivers of the SV-COMP set of
benchmark instances.
The second phase consisted in computing, for the instances that did not
produce a conclusive result, an under-approximation of the statement coverage
using verification to generate complete executions. We used two versions of the
same technique for the second phase: a standard verification technique, which
serves as a baseline, and a slight modification that integrates our heuristic. The
technique that we used is a flavor of ART-based value analysis with a traversal
geared towards quickly reaching the end of the program. The traversal is a com-
bination of depth-first-search with postorder (CFA nodes with a lower postorder
index are selected first).
We integrate our heuristic by using it as a second criterion for selection in
the traversal, that is, postorder is considered first and only in case of a tie the
score produced by our heuristic is used.
We configured our implementations with the lower of two limits: a time limit
of 900 s and a limit of 10 counterexamples.
Tables 1 and 2 contain the results of the second phase of the experiments.
Both tables comprise the instances that failed to produce a conclusive result
within 900 s: in the case of Table 1, the verification attempt used value analysis,
whereas Table 2 corresponds to verification using lazy predicate abstraction.
Both techniques can be configured in a number of different ways, we used the
same configuration used for the evaluation of CMC3.
The columns hold the following information, values enclosed in parenthesis
correspond to the heuristic presented:
– # lines: Total number of lines excluding comments and blank lines.
– Over A.: Over-approximation of coverage reported by CPAchecker. Corre-
sponds to the number of lines for which a node existed in the ART at the
moment when the execution was interrupted. The ART nodes could be un-
reachable, therefore this constitutes an over-approximation of our measure
of coverage.
– Under A.: Statement coverage under-approximation we computed.
– # exec.: Number of executions generated, and subsequently used, to compute
the under-approximation.
– Bug?: This column contains a check mark (X) when, while attempting to find
a terminating execution, the verification tool instead found and confirmed
an assertion violation.
– CPU time: Total CPU time used. We use a soft limit of 900 s but allow at
most 100 additional seconds for the CPAchecker to return.
3 CMC evaluation is available online: https://www.sosy-lab.org/~dbeyer/cpa-cmc/
Baseline ( with Heuristic)
# lines Over A. Under A. # exec. Bug? CPU time
token ring.14.BUG.c 833 594 570 (-) 1 (-) - (-) 28.68s (906.10s)
toy.c - - - (-) - (-) - (-) 979.53s (971.91s)
transmitter.16.BUG.c 900 658 - (N/A) - (1) - (X) 921.54s (22.85s)
farsync.BUG.c 5700 1944 - (N/A) - (7) - (X) 905.54s (217.85s)
gigaset.BUG.c 16188 1609 1077 (970) 9 (9) - (-) 55.91s (902.60s)
lirc imon.BUG.c 2166 875 - (611) - (6) - (-) 907.52s (905.77s)
loop.BUG.c - - - (-) - (-) - (-) 902.31s (912.45s)
ppp generic.BUG.c 6969 1849 - (848) - (2) - (-) 923.36s (924.99s)
synclink gt.BUG.c 11780 1112 - (N/A) - (1) - (X) 910.66s (13.68s)
Table 1. Complete results from explicit AA
Baseline (with Heuristic)
# lines Over A. Under A. # exec. Bug? CPU time
kundu.c 266 256 250 (252) 1 (2) - (-) 15.16s (878.60s)
mem slave tlm.3.c 796 550 490 (490) 1 (2) - (-) 20.46s (856.79s)
mem slave tlm.4.c 801 553 495 (495) 1 (2) - (-) 26.74s (856.69s)
mem slave tlm.5.c 806 753 500 (500) 1 (2) - (-) 32.46s (864.80s)
pipeline.c 388 267 0 (0) 0 (0) - (-) 87.67s (867.81s)
token ring.03.c 306 261 227 (253) 1 (5) - (-) 17.94s (854.81s)
token ring.04.c 364 307 265 (303) 1 (6) - (-) 60.42s (861.16s)
token ring.05.c 422 361 303 (353) 1 (7) - (-) 297.92s (863.45s)
token ring.06.c 480 415 341 (403) 1 (8) - (-) 439.57s (876.84s)
token ring.07.c 538 469 - (443) - (8) - (-) 905.58s (918.29s)
token ring.08.c 596 523 - (421) - (2) - (-) 909.00s (906.12s)
token ring.09.BUG.c 660 582 456 (458) 1 (1) - (-) 54.39s (913.39s)
token ring.14.BUG.c 833 743 570 (-) 1 (-) - (-) 190.27s (910.16s)
toy.c - - - (-) - (-) - (-) 967.02s (973.23s)
toy1 BUG.c 316 295 N/A (N/A) 10 (1) X(X) 34.86s (14.19s)
pktcdvd.BUG.c 6925 4660 - (857) - (3) - (-) 903.28s (855.53s)
Table 2. Complete results from predicate AA
6.1 Assertion failures
As a side effect of our definition requiring terminating executions, it is possible
to find executions violating the property of interest when collecting execution
for an under-approximation.
This occurred in our experiments: for some of the instances, while attempting
to produce terminating executions, the software model checker found assertion
violations instead, as reported in column “Bug?” in Tables 1 and 2.
This is not central to our contribution, but is relevant to the interpretation
of the results, since our under-approximation algorithm stops when an assertion
failure is reached.
6.2 RQ1: Is it possible to compute a useful under-approximation of
verification coverage efficiently?
As shown in Table 2, our approach in conjunction with the proposed heuristic
generated an under-approximation for 14 out of 16 incomplete lazy predicate
analysis explorations. Table 1 shows similar results, producing an under-approx-
imation for 6 out of 9 instances.
We used a time limit of 900 s which corresponds to the time allotted for the
first phase, the one consisting of the actual verification attempt. We consider
that longer running times could be deemed impractical by potential users but,
for most instances, an under-approximation was produced before the time limit
and the algorithm only kept refining it.
In this context, under-approximations are useful when they approach the
actual statement coverage value. Only for three instances the algorithm produced
a trivial under-approximation of 0: in two cases (transmitter.16.BUG.c and
synclink gt.BUG.c), it found an assertion failure and stopped within 5% of the
allotted time. In the remaining case (pipeline.c) the program exit seems to be
unreachable, since the instance resulting from replacing all existing assertions by
a single trivially false assertion at the return of the main method can be proved
safe using CPAchecker.
The values shown in Table 1 are mostly (9 out of 14) within 20% below the
over-approximation, possibly even closer to the actual value.
Table 2 contains more varied results. Nonetheless, all the values generated
are within 50% less than the over-approximation produced by CPAchecker, if
we consider the instances for which we produce an under-approximation and
exclude those for which an assertion was found. These lower ratios between the
under-approximation and the over-approximation are consistent with the inner
workings of the technique. Lazy predicate abstraction starts using a coarse pred-
icate abstraction that keeps track of no predicates. Throughout the construction
of the ART, especially with a breadth-first-search traversal, a significant number
of unreachable states could be added, inflating the over-approximation calculated
by CPAchecker.
In our opinion, these results suggest an affirmative answer to RQ1: it seems
possible to generate these under-approximations efficiently since we were able
to produce a result for the majority of the instances evaluated and the under-
approximations are of acceptable quality.
6.3 RQ 2: Does the heuristic proposed improve the
under-approximation produced within a limited time budget?
The heuristic proposed produced an under-approximation at least as good as
the standard verification technique for 22 out of the 25 instances considered
within the same allotted running time. Moreover, the heuristic outperformed
the baseline in 11 out of 25 instances.
These results seem to support an affirmative answer to RQ2 as well.
7 Related Work
There is a broad spectrum of research both proposing different test adequacy
criteria and evaluating their relation with reliability [21]. However, to the best
of our knowledge, the mentions of code coverage in the context of verification
are far fewer.
The most related previous work defined a measure of verification coverage [1]
consisting of the number of statements proven safe at a certain point. The def-
inition has some subtleties, but a statement which cannot throw any of the
predefined exceptions of interest is considered safe. The semantics, in this case,
is fundamentally different than that of test suite coverage making the metrics
incomparable, but might also not be entirely intuitive or easy to interpret, as the
authors themselves acknowledge, since many statements can be proved safe syn-
tactically, regardless of the context. In order to compute verification coverage,
they propose to adapt a standard imprecise verification algorithm such that it
computes a coverage metric besides producing the warnings of potential errors.
Their empirical evaluation suggests that the approach incurs in a significant
performance penalty: the running time of the algorithm increases by an order
of magnitude when adapted in this way. Lastly, it is not straightforward how
to compute the coverage measure for an incomplete verification attempt using a
standard technique, as we intend in our setting.
Existing work discussing functional coverage [18] briefly mentions two possi-
ble high-level approaches to quantify the verification coverage of complete veri-
fication attempts of a portion of a system. Our work, in contrast, discusses the
topic at a much lower level, having a single incomplete verification attempt as
our object of study.
Loop coverage has been discussed previously [14], although tangentially, in
relation to bounded-exploration tools. These tools can miss trivial defects when
the bound prevents the exploration from crossing a long-running loop. Loop
coverage is not defined in that work and only its intuitive meaning is used. The
authors use defect recall as a proxy for loop coverage. In contrast, we put forth
a detailed definition and discuss at length different ways compute an under-
approximation.
CPAchecker reports a coverage metric which, to the best of our knowledge,
has not been published nor defined formally. The number reported, as currently
implemented, can report unreachable code as covered and corresponds to an
over-approximation of our coverage metric. We discussed the problems of this
semantics in Section 2.
Our work is heavily influenced by earlier work on partial verification at-
tempts, such as the notion of Conditional Model Checking [4], exploration ora-
cles [9] and other complementary representations [10]. Their approaches, how-
ever, neither aim to quantify coverage nor provide any alternative metric of
progress or exploration.
8 Conclusion and Future Work
Software model checkers have dramatically improved within the last few years
and state-of-the-art tools are capable of tackling an increasing number of indus-
trial instances. However, a large number of systems remain intractable for full
verification. In this work, we attempt to extract valuable information from in-
complete verification attempts by producing a verification coverage metric. We
defined verification coverage in a manner that is consistent with that of coverage
in the context of testing and discussed several ways of producing an under-ap-
proximation of that metric. Our empirical evaluation suggests that acceptable
under-approximations can be computed efficiently.
Future work includes analyzing the correlation between our definition of cov-
erage and reliability, defect coverage and other relevant aspects of the quality of
the system.
Moreover, it would be interesting to explore how verification coverage evolves
throughout the execution of a software model checker.
It would also be valuable to propose and examine other quantifications of
verification progress and to devise efficient ways to compute them.
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